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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, one of the most striking illustrations of the increased 
inequality of income distribution over recent decades is the outsized growth in 
CEO compensation in contrast to the compensation of the contemporaneous 
average working man or women.1  The ratio of CEO pay to factory worker pay 
rose from 42-to-1 in 1960, to a height of 531-to-1 in 2000 at the height of the stock 
market bubble,2 and it was at 411-to-1 in 2005 and 344-to-1 in 2007.3  
Interestingly; this ratio is about 25-to-1 in Europe.4  “[A]fter adjusting for 
inflation, CEO pay in 2009 more than doubled the CEO pay average for the decade 
of the 1990’s, more than quadrupled the CEO pay average for the 1980’s, and ran 
approximately eight times the CEO average for all the decades of the mid-20th 
century.”5 
The increase of the CEO versus employee pay gap, along with the subject of 
growing income inequality in the United States, has been of concern for some 
time, but is an issue in particular during the current prolonged economic slump that 
began with the burst of the housing bubble and subsequent financial crisis, 
especially mortgage derivatives.6  As the United States endures its worst economic 
conditions since the Great Depression of the 1930’s,7 populist rhetoric has 
coalesced around the theme of the “99%” versus the “1%”, with the 1% loosely 
defined as the “richest” citizens of our country.8  Indeed, there continues to be calls 
to action in the form of “Occupy” movements that have no set organization or 
agenda, other than self-identified members of the so-called 99% publicly 
protesting what they perceive as the injustice around the concentration of income 
and wealth into the hands of fewer and fewer individuals, i.e., those that comprise 
                                                
*Juris Doctor Candidate, 2013, Pepperdine University School of Law; Bachelor of Arts in Business 
Economics and Sociology, 2010, University of California, Santa Barbara.  I would like to thank my 
friends and family for the support they have always provided me. 
1 See Sarah Anderson, Chuck Collins, Sam Pizzigati & Kevin Shih, CEO Pay and the Great 
Recession: 17th Annual Executive Compensation Survey, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Sept. 1, 
2010), http://www.ips-dc.org/files/2433/EE-2010-web.pdf.dc.org/files/2433/EE-2010-web.pdf, at 4. 
2 G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?, http:// 
www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Anderson et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
6 Agustino Fontevecchia, Occupy Wall Street: Income Inequality and the Burden of Action, 
FORBES (Nov. 17, 2011, 8:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/11/17/occupy-
wall-street-income-inequality-and-the-burden-of-action/. 
7 Anderson et al., supra note 1, at 5. 
8 See Tami Luhby, Who are the 1 percent?, CNN MONEY (Oct. 29, 2011, 8:40 AM), http://
money.cnn.com/2011/10/20/news/economy/occupy_wall_street_income/index.htm. 
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the top 1%.9  Some of the “Occupy” protesters are socialists and anarchists, who 
are genuinely seeking to overthrow capitalism, some are just hangers-on looking to 
take advantage of the feel-good circus atmosphere that comes with any large 
outdoor gathering, and some are the usual malcontents that will show up at any 
venue that offers them a way to rebel against social norms.10  But what likely 
triggers the concern of large numbers of ordinary American citizens, whether they 
simply sympathize, or actually show up at a protest event, is the media reports of 
the very real compensation packages granted to top corporate executives and to top 
earners in the financial industry.11   
Although less than a fifth of the income of the nation’s wealthiest individuals 
actually comes from wages and salaries, the symbolism of a CEO making 
hundreds of times more than their average employee during a time of massive 
layoffs, rampant underemployment, and persistent unemployment is undeniable.12  
Even in other, better economic times this growing discrepancy would violate the 
average American’s sense of what is fair and unfair.13  In this extraordinarily 
negative economy, the sense of unfairness is magnified and widespread, and 
invites the implementation of yet another wave of solutions aimed at “fixing” the 
causes of this growing economic injustice.14  
In the past, a wide variety of political players have sought to confront what 
their constituents see as excessive executive bonuses and inappropriately high 
incentives, and thus the U.S. government has a history of attempting to use 
policies, regulations, and taxes to temper or reverse the CEO versus worker pay 
gap in real income terms.15  Indeed, many combinations have been tried in the 
United States,16 but as discussed in this paper, so far none have proved effective.17 
The goal of this paper will be to examine the role of the U.S. Government in 
                                                
9 Josh Barro, We Are the 99 Percent—Even Rich People, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Oct. 5, 
2011, 8:26 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/agenda/279319/we-are-99-percent-even-rich-people-
josh-barro; see also Joseph Klein, Ninety-Nine Percent Narcissists, FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE (Oct. 7, 
2011), http://frontpagemag.com/2011/10/07/ninety-nine-percent-narcissists/. 
10 See Ginia Bellafante, Gunning for Wall Street, With Faulty Aim, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/25/nyregion/protesters-are-gunning-for-wall-street-with-faulty-
aim.html; Drake Bennett, David Graeber, the Anti-Leader of Occupy Wall Street, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (October 26, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/david-graeber-the-
antileader-of-occupy-wall-street-10262011.html#p1 (noting that a key member of the original Occupy 
movement is “an anarchist and radical organizer”); Socialist Party USA: Occupy Wall St.!, SOCIALIST 
PARTY USA, http://www.socialistparty-usa.org/occupywallstreet.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) 
(Socialist Party USA supporting the Occupy Wall Street movement). 
11 Agustino Fonevecchia, Occupy Wall Street, JPMorgan, and The Fall of The Banks, FORBES 
(Oct. 17, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/10/17/jpmorgans-
disappointing-earnings-and-occupy-wall-street-have-a-common-cause/. 
12 Domhoff, supra note 2. 
13 Id. 
14 Anderson et al., supra note 1, at 13. 
15 Daniel Jurow, Sophie Romana, James Deasy, Walter Haddick, Natalie Napierala & Tiffany 
Cale, Executive Compensation: How Does Pay Influence Decisions and Governance?, THE SANFORD 
C. BERNSTEIN & CO. CENTER FOR LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS AT COLUMBIA BUSINESS SCHOOL, 7–9, 
http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/leadership/about/leb/embapaper (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
16 Id.  
17 See discussion infra Part VII. 
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the CEO versus worker pay gap, both in contributing to its creation and the ability 
to reverse it.  To better understand this issue, this paper will include a survey of 
current U.S. and foreign CEO compensation practices, a survey of theories 
proposed to explain the divergence between U.S. and foreign CEO compensation, 
a review of the social and business impact of excessive CEO compensation, and 
identify socioeconomic theories regarding the excessive CEO pay trend.  This will 
be followed by a review of the history of attempted solutions along with newly 
enacted and proposed future solutions to further inhibit the growth of excessive 
CEO pay, and concluding remarks.   
II.  CURRENT U.S. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PRACTICES 
Generally, the board of directors exists to advise and monitor top 
management, protect the interests of the shareholders and, of significance to this 
paper, establish executive compensation.18  “A significant component of a 
management control system is the incentive mechanism and motivational 
underpinning of compensation contracts.”19  A properly planned incentive and 
compensation system can deal with both adverse-selection and moral hazard 
issues.20 
A. The Nature of Cash and Company Stock Compensation Packages 
The most popular forms of compensation are cash and company stock.  Cash 
compensation to executives has two main facets: fixed salary and bonus.21  
Bonuses are generally attributed to a successful implementation of organizational 
objectives through managerial decisions made by an executive.22  “Stock grants 
and stock option grants are intended to reward executives for choices that influence 
positive changes in the stock prices and as such may be considered a future-
oriented reward system, as opposed to bonuses that are typically based on some 
accounting measure of profitability.”23  It has been suggested that accounting 
performance measures are used in order to protect executives from being 
negatively affected by circumstances that are out of their control, such as 
marketwide fluctuations in firm value.24  
Stock prices are clouded by collateral as they are effected by large market–
wide fluctuations, such as ordinary business cycles, as well as monetary and fiscal 
decisions and policies, and therefore do not create a direct and absolute correlation 
                                                
18 Ivan E. Brick, Oded Palmon & John K. Wald, CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and 
Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 403, 404 (2006). 
19 Mahmoud M. Nourayi & Sudha Krishnan, The Impact of Incentives on CEO Compensation and 
Firm Performance, 53 INT’L REV. ECON. 402, 402 (2006). 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 403. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. It has been argued that accounting-based measures are historical measures of performance, 
and thus conceptually less relevant from a shareholder’s perspective.  Id. 
24 Id. at 404–05. (citing another source).   
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with executive performance.25  The actual compensation received through stock–
based incentives depends on economic variables and contractual restrictions that 
affect these stocks and grants.26  Various factors, including the volatility of the 
stock, and fiscal and monetary policies, are beyond the control of the CEO.27  
Because of this, stock-based compensation carries with it a significant amount of 
risk into the agency relationship that exists between the CEO and the company, 
making compensation less responsive as a measure of performance.28  Some have 
observed a “lower sensitivity of CEO compensation to the rate of return to 
shareholders as the stock becomes more volatile.”29 
Nourayi and Krishnan found that while both accounting and market 
measures of performance affect the amount realized by a CEO through cash 
compensation, market-based analyses saw a more direct correlation with total 
compensation.30  They also found that “CEO compensation contracts with stock 
options are more significantly influenced by the market-based performance 
measure than by the accounting-based measure”, and concluded ultimately “that 
firms with market-based returns are less likely to offer market-based incentives.”31 
B. Indirect Components of CEO Compensation 
CEO compensation can be both direct and indirect.32  Direct compensation 
includes cash and stock options.  Indirect compensation exists in forms other than 
those paid directly to the executive, among which are tax breaks.33   
C. Government Response 
As discussed in more detail later in this paper, the government has put forth 
measures within the last few decades to encourage less excessive executive 
compensation.34  For example, in 1993, Congress capped the deductibility of 
CEOs’ salaries at $1 million, unless the extra pay was linked to performance 
incentives.35  As a result, boards of directors raised CEOs’ potential income with 
increasingly generous stock options, which helped drive executive compensation 
off the charts.  
                                                
25 Id. at 403.   
26 Id. at 406.  
27 Id. 
28 Id. (citing another source). 
29 Id. (citing another source).  
30 Id. at 418. 
31 Id. at 418–419.  
32 David O. Friedrichs, Exorbitant CEO Compensation: Just Reward or Grand Theft?, 51 CRIME, 
LAW & SOC. CHANGE 45, 50 (2009). 
33 See id. 
34 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 162(m), 280G, 4999 (2006).  
35 Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government Regulation and the Structure of 
Compensation Contracts, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 453–454 (2001).  
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D. Outcome 
While CEOs themselves are not struggling, they are causing others to – by 
cutting jobs to attribute more wealth to their own already bountiful assets.36  The 
CEOs in 2009 who slashed their payrolls the most “took home 42[%] more 
compensation than the year’s chief executive pay average for S&P 500 
companies.”37  These excessive rewards gave an enticement and encouragement to 
behave irresponsibly and to behave in such a way that would effectively contribute 
to the financial crisis.38 
III.  COMPENSATION PRACTICES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 
As previously noted in this paper’s introduction, the CEO-to-factory-worker 
pay ratio in the United States went from 42-to-1 in 1960 to its peak at 531-to-1 in 
the year 2000.39  The ratio of CEO pay to factory worker pay then decreased post-
Internet Bubble, and was at 411-to-1 in 2005 and 344-to-1 in 2007, while during 
this same time frame in Europe, this ratio was about 25-to-1.40  This section will 
examine the practices, proposals, and trends related to executive compensation 
practices that are underway in several other countries. 
A. France 
France is a country with a very powerful and decentralized administration 
and regulatory system.41  In the years leading up to Nicolas Sarkozy’s election as 
President, French public opinion was shaken by the reports of very large severance 
pay packages given to a number of CEOs who had been forced out of their 
positions by reason of disastrous corporate results.42  Mr. Sarkozy promised to 
respond to the outrage, and after being elected President he introduced a bill 
regarding severance packages that was passed into law on August 21, 2007.43  The 
law called for “clear, publically available performance criteria to be used” in 
determining severance pay, and that severance packages account for both 
individual executive and overall corporate performance.44 
In the fall of 2008, seeking to further inhibit excessive executive pay, the 
French government examined other options, including creating a new government 
entity and encouraging the adoption of say on pay shareholder rights.45  These two 
                                                
36 See generally Anderson, et al., supra note 1. 
37 Id. at 4. 
38 Id. 
39 Domhoff, supra note 2. 
40 Id. 
41 Jurow et al., supra note 15, at 11–12. 
42 Id. at 11. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. “Say on pay” shareholders rights “shift additional power to shareholders through binding or 
advisory votes on compensation issues so that they may effectively prod the board to refine poorly 
designed proposals to better represent shareholder interest.”  Id. at 9. 
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ideas were rejected in favor of allowing employers a chance at further reform 
through self-regulation.46  The voluntary rules included not allowing executives to 
be members of their own company’s board of directors, not issuing severance for 
executives who voluntarily leave their company to go work somewhere else or for 
those who leave because of poor performance, no granting of stock options without 
all employees participating, not discounting stock grants (executives must buy 
stock at market prices), and capping special annual retirement funds.47   
Unfortunately, voluntary compliance with these rules was found to be 
severely lacking, and this lead to ratification of a new law on executive 
compensation on March 31, 2009.48  This new law contains multiple innovative 
provisions such as prohibiting the granting of stock options or discounted stock to 
the executives and board members of any company that has received bailout 
monies from the French government.49  The law also includes the provision that if 
a company is involved in massive layoffs of employees, any variable compensation 
plan for corporate executives is automatically suspended.50  Additionally, the law 
includes the requirement that forces the exclusion of CEOs from board 
membership, as well as prohibits board chairmen from employment at the same 
company where they sit on the board.51  Moreover, severance pay can only be 
given upon forced termination, provided the company is not in financial trouble, 
and may not exceed two years in duration.52 
B. Netherlands 
The New Dutch Corporate Governance Code (the “Code”) went into effect 
on January 1, 2009.53  The Code strictly defines the acceptable structure of 
executive management compensation schemes, which can include a fixed and 
variable component, with the variable component consisting of predetermined, 
predominately long-term targets.54  In any case, it is mandated that management 
remuneration schemes cannot encourage executives to act in their sole best 
interests.55  The remuneration schemes must also be analyzed against scenarios 
that examine the extent of the risks that the variable portion of a remuneration 
scheme may expose the company, and a report of this risk analysis must be made 
public through the company’s web site.56  Implicit in this requirement is the 
acknowledgment that certain executive compensation practice can pose a threat to 
                                                
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 11–12. 
48 Id. at 12. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 13. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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the integrity of a firm.57 
C. Japan 
Japan differs from other countries in that seniority, not performance, is the 
most important factor determining executive compensation.58  Another difference 
is that within the Japanese culture, large executive compensation packages are held 
to be “socially offensive.”59  These two cultural factors have resulted in a stark 
difference between the average pay of Japanese CEOs and that of their Western 
counterparts.60  It has also resulted in a low multiple, about 30 to 40 times, 
between average CEO pay and the minimum wage.61 
These two cultural factors have another interesting effect.  Japanese CEO 
pay, since it is based on seniority, does not change whether a company has a good 
year or a bad year.62  There is little or nothing in Japanese CEO pay related to 
annual or long-term incentives.63  Both the good and bad of this is that there is 
little incentive for risk-taking.64  It has been recently observed that the Japanese 
national culture is slowly changing, and reward for individual excellence is 
increasing.65 
D. Germany 
Germany is transitioning to the view that businesses must go beyond being 
merely profit-oriented, to being “responsible citizens” within their society.66  
Consistent with this idea, along with Austria, Germany is considering 
incorporating environmental, social, and governance metrics alongside the 
expected executive compensation components of individual and firm 
performance.67  If this level of social accountability becomes a mandated part of 
every CEO pay package in Germany, it will force a level of transparency that 
makes explicit the social compact that many likely feel should be at least implicit 
in other capitalistic systems, including the United States. 
IV.  THEORIES EXPLAINING  DIFFERENCE IN U.S. VERSUS FOREIGN CEO PAY  
In Asia, executive compensation is “far more modest than what it is in the 
                                                
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 14. 
67 Id. at 13. 
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United States”;68 exemplifying this is the average compensation of Japanese 
corporate presidents coming in at under $500,000.69  Even the Western world 
counterpart, Britain, had much more socially acceptable and modest executive pay 
packages than its American counterparts.70  “Yet there is no particular evidence 
that American corporations during this period have been more effectively managed 
or led than their Asian or British counterparts, or that American CEOs are more 
talented and harder working.”71  If it were possible to subtract out the unintended 
consequences of U.S. government actions that actually had the perverse effect of 
increasing CEO pay rather than dampening its rate of increase relative to the 
average worker, are there still understandable and socially acceptable reasons why 
American CEOs would earn more on average than their foreign counterparts? 
There are multiple theories that possibly explain why foreign CEOs have not 
experienced the same rapid increase in pay as seen in the United States, 
independent of deleterious government actions and interference.  This section will 
briefly summarize five of them. Explaining  
A. Marginal Revenue Product Theory 
Marginal Revenue Product is the amount that a factor of production, 
including management labor, contributes to the value of a firm.72  In a well-
functioning competitive labor market, the negotiations between an informed buyer 
(i.e. the Board of Directors), and an informed seller (i.e. the CEO), should result in 
the CEO being paid their marginal revenue product.73  This is because the 
company will hire “labor up to the point that . . . the wage rate, [which represents 
the cost of an additional worker], equals the additional revenue” contribution of 
that worker.74  Thus, the position of CEO would be more highly compensated, 
based on the extent of the potential and real higher contribution to the firm.75   
Good individual managers can have significant impact on the growth in a 
firm’s value, and firms with higher growth potential can therefore afford to 
discriminate and pay what it takes to attract and retain management with the skills 
to realize that potential.76  Correspondingly, CEOs who can handle more complex 
tasks and more complex organizations are more talented and thus better paid.77  
The same is true of CEOs who have both the skills and opportunity to operate 
within economic systems that permit them to exercise more organizational 
                                                
68 Friedrichs, supra note 32, at 52. 
69 Id. (based on figures for the year 2005). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market 
Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1176 (2004). 
73 Id. at 1200. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1201. 
77 Id. at 1202. 
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power.78  Therefore, a straightforward explanation of the tendency of foreign 
CEOs to be paid less than American CEOs may be found in some combination of 
comparative circumstances where foreign CEOs have less growth opportunity, 
smaller and less complex organizations, or weaker corporate powers.79 
B. Tournament Theory 
The Tournament Theory holds that each round of management advancement 
is a competition characterized by what are essentially single-elimination rounds.80  
Thus, high senior executive pay is the prize money given to the ultimate winner of 
the contests that make up each firm’s internal labor market.81  Big tournaments 
tend to award big prize money, and the CEOs of U.S. firms tend to have much 
more power than the CEOs of foreign firms, so American CEO jobs are 
comparatively the bigger tournaments and the American CEO pay the bigger 
prizes.82  The disparity in U.S. versus foreign CEO pay is further amplified by 
acceptance of the “winner-take-all” attitude in American culture.83  This theory 
also explains internal corporate pay differences such as the often large difference 
in middle management pay and CEO pay within U.S. firms.84 
C. Opportunity Cost Theory 
The Opportunity Cost Theory asserts that CEO pay is largely determined by 
the amount they would be paid in their next best alternative job opportunity.85  In 
order to attract and retain CEO talent, a firm must pay at least an amount equal to 
an individual’s specific opportunity costs.86 
Applying this theory, the rise in American CEO pay starting in the 1980s can 
be explained by the opening up of financial markets, which in turn gave American 
CEOs many more employment alternatives.87  In contrast, foreign markets tended 
to be more fragmented and regulated, have less capital available for starting new 
business ventures, which left foreign CEOs historically with fewer employment 
options.88  Thus, relatively lower opportunity cost drives relatively lower pay for 
foreign CEOs. 
                                                
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1203–09. 
80 Id. at 1209–10. 
81 Id. at 1176. 
82 Id. at 1176–77. 
83 Id. at 1177. 
84 Id. at 1212. 
85 Id. at 1177. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
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D. Bargaining Power Theory 
The Bargaining Power Theory accounts for the shift in power in the mid-
1980s that increased the relative bargaining power of American CEOs in takeover 
bids.89  As a result of court decisions, legal entitlement to approve hostile 
takeovers shifted from a firm’s shareholders to its management and board of 
directors.90  Specifically, in Moran v. Household International, Inc., the Delaware 
Supreme Court, for the first time, upheld the ability to block hostile takeovers 
through Shareholder Rights Plans.91  The United States Supreme Court further 
added to management’s powers by upholding stringent state anti-takeover laws.92  
At about the same time there was a push for pay-for-performance by big 
institutional investors that caused a dramatic increase in the use of stock options 
and restricted stock in CEO pay packages.93 
All of the changes in the mid-1980s that dramatically increased the 
bargaining power of American CEOs, in turn, caused U.S. CEO pay packages to 
dramatically increase relative to the pay packages of foreign CEOs, who saw no 
corresponding increase in their bargaining power.94  American CEOs subsequently 
had the power to negotiate large pay and severance packages, and agreements with 
terms that favored them in exchange for a relinquishment of their block of a hostile 
acquisition of their firm.95 
E. Risk Adjustment Theory 
The Risk Adjustment Theory recognizes that American CEOs, unlike foreign 
CEOs, tend to receive much of their pay in stock options.96  As a result, American 
CEOs likely have much of their personal wealth in company stock.97  This 
unbalanced personal financial portfolio constitutes a relatively large risk, and thus 
American CEOs seek to be compensated for the size of this risk.98  In turn, 
companies are forced to pay CEOs more to get them to take the risk of narrowly 
concentrating their wealth in a single financial instrument.99 
Foreign CEOs face much less pressure to hold company stock and there is 
usually no incentive for foreign companies to use stock options instead of cash 
when it comes to bonus pay.100  Without the concentration of wealth caused by the 
                                                
89 Id. at 1241. 
90 Id. 
91 See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985). 
92 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of 
second generation of state antitakeover statutes). 
93 Thomas, supra note 72, at 1241. 
94 See Domhoff, supra note 2. 
95 See Thomas, supra note 72, at 1244. 
96 Id. at 1179. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1179–80.  Many foreign CEOs work in countries with debt-based systems (versus the 
equity-based system of the United States) where the creditors “care about minimizing the agency costs 
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extensive use of stock options as a form of executive pay, there is less firm-
specific risk to be compensated for.101 
V.  THE SOCIAL AND BUSINESS IMPACT 
Since every government action impacting an aspect of the American 
economic system has associated direct and indirect costs and risks, a fundamental 
question is whether the distortions resulting from the current CEO compensation 
practices are fair or harmful to society as a whole, i.e., is there a compelling, 
rational, justifiable need to act.  Perhaps the real issue of CEO pay is more the 
results of powerful symbolism, with concern resulting from the (artificially 
elevated?) sensationalism surrounding the big income numbers of a few outliers 
that are occasionally reported in the news media, that is then picked up and used by 
special interest groups to fit their own propaganda scripts.  Is this a case of envy 
magnified by the combination of the current economic downturn and the very 
connected world of social media, instant communications, and around-the-clock 
news outlets?  In such a case, rather than a direct economic link to harming other 
members of society, maybe the real harm could be the impact of the sensationalism 
itself, as it serves to undermine confidence in the legal, corporate, and political 
institutions that are woven together to create the economic engine of the United 
States.  While such a new-found lack of faith in the American system of capitalism 
does seem to be a major theme repeatedly reported on in the current prolonged 
economic downturn, some hold that movements such as “Occupy Wall Street” are 
simply “a natural reaction to a downturn in the [economic] cycle.”102  If that is the 
case, short of the remotely slim chance of provoking a revolution, possibly the 
worst harm would be contributing enough to negative consumer sentiment to 
somewhat delay the economy’s recovery.  Thus, pursuing government remedies 
and countermeasure for current CEO pay practices would then be waste of time 
and taxpayer monies. 
On the other hand, perhaps there is a direct economic link to harming other 
members of society because of distortions resulting from the current CEO 
compensation practices.  Conceivably, it is possible that CEO compensation 
practices are more than bad optics for the social media to rant about and are 
actually causing distortions in the economy that are harming large segments of 
American society or even the American economy’s health, growth, and 
competiveness as a whole.  And perhaps the harm created is both direct, such as 
decisions that hurt the results and potential of individual corporations, and indirect, 
such as giving permission to other actors in the economic arena, like members of 
financial institutions, to equally pursue outrageous, excessive, unjustified, and 
                                                
of debt.”  Id. at 1254.  The creditors don’t want to align the interests and incentives of the managers 
with those of the shareholders, because this would increase the agency costs of debt.  Id.  “Furthermore,  
most  of these countries’ firms have control shareholders already monitoring managers to insure  that 
they do what is in (the controlling) shareholders’ best interests,  so additional alignment is 
unnecessary.”  Id.  
101 Id. at 1180. 
102 Fonevecchia, supra note 11.  
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even corrupt compensation practices.  It may be that the real ultimate harm of bad 
CEO compensation practices is that it drives, across the entire economy, CEO 
behavior and decisions that result in producing suboptimal long-term performance 
in American corporations.  This, in turn, is causing a transfer of American wealth, 
power, prestige, and political strength to other nations less prone to American-style 
corporate executive compensation practices.  If indeed this is the situation, with 
potentially dire geopolitical consequences for the American public, the appropriate 
follow-on is to discover whether current and past attempts in government 
sponsored remedies and countermeasures are a cure or a cause of problematic CEO 
compensation practices.  
Therefore, it is important that the question of whether the distortions 
resulting from the current CEO compensation practices are fair or harmful to 
society as a whole be considered in the context of the bigger issue of the 
concentration of wealth and power in American society and its potential 
consequences.  In other words, does the envy of highly paid executives have 
enough underlying substance accompanying it to justify anger and action, or is 
perception distinct from reality in this case? 
A. Wealth Distribution 
 In the United States, wealth is highly concentrated in a relatively few hands.  
As of 2010, the top 1% of households (the upper class) owned 35.4% of all 
privately held wealth, and the next 19% (the managerial, professional, and small 
business stratum) had 53.5%, which means that just 20% of the people owned a 
remarkable 89%, leaving only 11% of the wealth for the bottom 80% (wage and 
salary workers).103   
Between 1983 and 2004, the top 1% of American saw their net worth grow 
$6 million on average, a 78% inflation adjusted increase, while the bottom 40% 
experienced a drop of 59% in their average net worth, and the middle class 
experienced a remarkable increase in debt.104 
B. Income Distribution 
“As of 2007, income inequality in the United States was at an all-time high 
for the past 95 years, with the top 0.01% . . . receiving 6% of all U.S. wages, 
double what it was . . . in 2000; the top 10% received 49.7%, the highest since 
1917.”105  From 1949 to 1979, “the income of the bottom 80% of wage earners 
rose at a higher rate than that of the top 1%” of wage earners.106  Since 1979, and 
especially more recently, this has changed considerably.107  “Between 1966 and 
2001, median wage salary income increased by just 11%, after inflation[, whereas,] 
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[a]t the 99th percentile . . . the rise was 121%.”108  These numbers alone should be 
a major cause for concern and a probing analysis.  But further, at the 99.99th 
percentile, the rise was 617%.109  Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data released in 
2007 shows that the top 3 million Americans represented income equivalent to that 
of the bottom 150 million Americans combined in 2005.110  Compared with the 
current gap between the top and bottom of the income ladder, inequality of this 
magnitude has not existed since prior to the stock market crash of the 1920’s.111 
C. Examples of Harm 
A research paper entitled “When Executives Rake in Millions: Meanness in 
Organizations” was published in 2010.112  The authors looked for correlations 
between executive compensation and how employees are treated.113  Their key 
finding: the larger the disparity between executive pay and that of the typical 
employee, the more likely employees are to be mistreated.114  The hypothesis: the 
larger the pay gap, the more likely executives are to be arrogant and dictatorial. 115 
Beyond the harm to a firm caused by the damaging behavior driven by 
distorted risk-taking incentives built into current CEO compensation practices, 
there are multiple associated forms of social harm that arise.  First, if CEO 
compensation is excessive, then the unwarranted or unnecessary portion of that 
compensation takes away returns, wages, or benefits that could, or should, go to 
others such as employees and shareholders.116  Secondly, given the potent 
symbolism of perceived excess in CEO compensation, it can damage the social 
fabric by generating widely diffused distrust, resentment, and anger.117  Finally, 
excessive CEO pay can ultimately create a “poisoning” effect that could jeopardize 
continuation of the political-economic structure our system exists within.118 
                                                
108 Id.  
109 Id.  This percentile “represent[s] the 13,000 highest-paid workers in the American economy.”  
Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 51 (citing Paul Krugman, An Unjustified Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/opinion/13krugman.html).  “For some commentators, then, the recent 
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EXECUTIVES RAKE IN MILLIONS: THE CALLOUS TREATMENT OF LOWER LEVEL EMPLOYEES (2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612486. 
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VI.  PROPOSED THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
A. The Agency Problem  
The board of directors of a corporation may be ineffective in acting as a 
proper check on executive performance and behavior “because board culture 
inhibits constructive criticism, and because of informational asymmetry problems 
that exist between management and the board.”119  The board is compensated by 
the company, and coupled with excessive compensation to the board may further 
encourage a lack of criticism.120  Expanding on this, the lack of control of the rapid 
increase in executive pay can be viewed as an agency problem between 
shareholders and management, because public companies have dispersed 
ownership that cannot be expected to effectively bargain at arm’s length with 
management.121  As a result, managers exercise extensive influence over their own 
compensation.  “Any discussion of executive compensation must proceed against 
the background of the fundamental agency problem afflicting management 
decision-making.”122  There are two prevailing views on how the executive 
compensation and agency problems may be linked: the “optimal contracting 
approach” and the “managerial power approach.”123 
B. Optimal Contracting Approach 
The financial economists’ dominant approach to the study of executive 
compensation—the “optimal contracting approach”—views these pay 
arrangements as a partial remedy to the agency problem.124  The board attempts to 
use the compensation packages to cost-effectively incentivize the managers.125  
Under this model, the main flaw with the existing practice of executive 
compensation seems to be that compensation schemes are not sufficiently high 
powered “due to political limitations on how generously executives can be 
treated.”126  “Optimal compensation contracts could result either from effective 
arm’s length bargaining between the board and the executives, or from market 
constraints that induce these parties to adopt such contracts even in the absence of 
arm’s length bargaining.”127  A large problem arises when one sees the favoritism 
among the board-CEO relationship.  “Directors will generally wish to be re-
                                                
119 Brick et al., supra note 18, at 404. 
120 Id.  Compensation for each Enron director is reported to have been $380,619 for the year 2001.  
Id.  “Most observers agree that the high compensation of Enron’s directors may have compromised 
their objectivity in monitoring management on behalf of shareholders.”  Id.   
121 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (Nat’l 
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appointed to the board[,]” which, “[b]esides an attractive salary . . . provide[s] 
prestige and valuable business and social connections.”128  CEOs play an integral 
role in choosing boards, which provides most directors with an “incentive to favor 
the CEO.”129 
C. Managerial Power Approach 
Another approach, termed the “managerial power approach,” views 
executive compensation “not only as a potential instrument for addressing agency 
problems[,] but also as part of the agency problem itself.”130  Because executives 
seem to have substantial influence over their own pay, as this increases, so does 
their ability to extract greater rents.131  A major component of the managerial 
power approach is “‘outrage’ costs and constraints.”132  This constraint is based 
around how much outrage a proposed compensation package is expected to cause 
with shareholders and relevant outsiders—the more outrage that is expected, the 
less likely directors will be to approve the arrangement in order to avoid 
embarrassment or reputational harm, and reduce shareholders’ support for the 
incumbent board in proxy contests and takeover bids.133  There is evidence that 
suggests pay arrangements are indeed influenced by outsider perception.134  This 
“outrage” pillar of the managerial power approach leads into the next—the 
“camouflage,” which is the means by which managers try to “obscure” or 
“legitimize” (“camouflage”) their extraction of rents to avoid the previously 
discussed “outrage.”135  This helps explain many otherwise unexplainable 
occurrences in executive compensation practices.136  
Four patterns and practices can be somewhat attributed by power and 
camouflage: “the relationship between power and pay; the use of compensation 
consultants; executive loans; and golden good-bye payments to departing 
executives.”137   
                                                
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).  
131 Id. at 5.  Managerial rent seeking is when the pay arrangements are structured so that the 
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CEO’s of firms receiving negative media coverage of their compensation 
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A power-pay relationship that is advantageous for a CEO can result from a 
weak board or a lack of a large outside shareholder.138  Likewise, the presence of a 
large outside shareholder is likely to result in closer monitoring and thus is 
expected to reduce a CEO’s influence over his own compensation.139  Also, a large 
concentration of institutional shareholders might result in greater monitoring and 
scrutiny of the CEO and the board.140  A trend has shown that a more concentrated 
institutional ownership leads to lower executive compensation and more 
performance-sensitive compensation.141 
U.S. public companies often employ what are known as compensation 
consultants to aid in structuring pay packages, which also can result in furthering 
the camouflaging of rents.142  Providing advice that negatively affects the CEO or 
other executives would only hinder the consultant’s chances of future employment 
with the current firm or another firm, which provides a perverse incentive for them 
to apply their expertise in a way that helps increase the compensation packages.143  
They can provide types of compensation data that are most favorable to 
accomplish their analyses and recommendation to that end.144 
Executive loans,145 “pension plans, deferred compensation, and post-
retirement perks” are among the practices used to make the total compensation 
package less transparent.146  Along with being less transparent, these practices all 
make the executive pay less salient as well.147   
Finally, golden parachutes are the practice of the board giving a departing 
CEO payments and benefits that are gratuitous—not required under the terms of 
the CEO’s compensation contract.”148  These can occur when the CEO’s 
performance has warranted his or her replacement.149  It is hard to reconcile such 
                                                
138 Id.  
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gratuitous golden parachute payments with the efficient optimization that would or 
should occur as a result from an arm’s length, optimal contracting approach.150  
However, a golden parachute pay package may be necessary to discard a CEO 
whom many directors are loyal to in order to assemble a board majority in favor of 
replacing him.151  These payments result from the CEO’s relationship with, and 
influence over, the board.152 
D. Extravagant Compensation as a Criminological Phenomenon 
There is a compelling argument that extravagant CEO compensation is 
appropriately regarded as a criminological phenomenon, and thus it is a societal 
failure not to treat it as a crime.153  While criminal behavior can often be associated 
with social harm, they are not synonymous.154  This can be exemplified by having 
instances of criminal behavior that have no social harm and some perfectly legal 
actions that can cause great social harm—although later, many of these can 
become illegal, such as monopolistic practices.155  Friedrichs claims “that 
exorbitant CEO compensation should be recognized as a form of white-collar 
crime” in the same vein that other business practices have since become illegal.156   
Framing the exorbitant CEO compensation issue in criminological terms allows for 
a richer understanding of both the parallels and possible differences between such 
phenomena that occur in the most privileged circles within society and those forms 
of harm occurring principally in the most underprivileged circles that are 
conventionally—and without much controversy—regarded as crime.157 
Friedrichs explains a basic typology of views on such CEO compensation 
that can be introduced within three classifications: earned, excessive, and 
extortionate.158  The earned perspective takes the view that, however excessive 
CEO compensation may seem to be, it is fully merited for their hard work and 
unique talents.159  “CEOs . . . are . . . entitled to whatever extravagant 
compensation is awarded to them.”160  In the excessive view, extravagant CEO pay 
                                                
forgiveness of another loan, and allowed her unvested options to automatically 
vest and remain exercisable until the end of their original terms.  These gratuitous 
benefits were in addition to the considerable benefits that she received under her 
employment agreement, which included a termination payment of $26.4 million 
and a stream of retirement benefits exceeding $700,000 per year. 
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is excessive; CEOs are entitled to be paid well, but certain levels that are 
extravagant are too excessive.161   
While the first two classifications are all but mundane in comparison, the 
third introduces a more controversial, albeit not novel, approach.  The extortionate 
“view regards excessive CEO compensation as a function of inherently corrupt 
dimensions of the present structure of corporate governance, rife with multiple 
conflicts of interest allowing for out-of-control self-dealing, and wholly 
unwarranted relative to the contribution to corporate profitability made by 
CEOs.”162  When excessive pay accompanies poor performance of the firm, it 
becomes especially egregious.163  Through this outlook, legal reform is the 
appropriate response, although whether it should be regarded as a civil and 
regulatory issue versus a criminal issue is another layer of argument.164  One of the 
themes that Friedrichs explores is that the lines between instances of obvious 
criminal conduct and those of “exorbitant CEO compensation” can be quite 
ambiguous.165  
A recent case in Germany in 2006 could be an indicator of the direction the 
issue could head.166  Criminal charges were brought against directors of a mobile 
phone company for having awarded the CEO a bonus of $31 million.167  While the 
case was resolved with a settlement, it can establish a standard for the 
criminalization of excessive and egregious compensation packages.168  
 
E. Cronyism 
A 2006 study investigated whether overcompensation of directors and CEOs 
is related to firm underperformance.169  CEO and director compensation was 
modeled “using a variety of firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and 
governance variables.”170  The study found “that director compensation is closely 
related to the monitoring and effort required of directors to ensure value 
maximization.”171  However, the study also found “a highly significant positive 
relation between CEO and director compensation.”172  There is also a positive 
relation (0.472) between the annual director fee and the CEO total 
compensation.173  They hypothesized that “this relation could be due to unobserved 
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firm complexity (omitted variables) or to excessive compensations of directors and 
managers associated with an environment of ineffective monitoring, which is 
termed cronyism in the popular press.”174  Upon testing these, the evidence 
suggested and supported the hypothesis that the relationship between CEO and 
director compensation was symptomatic of cronyism where the relationship 
between firm performance and excess compensation was negative.175  
VII.  ATTEMPTED U.S. SOLUTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS 
Government regulation of executive pay has historically been not only 
incomplete and ineffective, but has also had perverse and unintended 
consequences.176  The topics of what is fair compensation for executives and how 
to best tie executive compensation to long-term creation of shareholder value are 
not exactly recent points of contention.177  In fact, from its creation, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has tried to determine whether the 
value a company created was being appropriately shared with employee and 
shareholders, or if it was inappropriately being hoarded or otherwise benefiting 
management.178 
A. SEC Rule Requiring Simple-To-Understand Table for Executive 
Compensation 
Inevitably, when federal policymakers attempted to intercede, usually in 
response to considerable pressure from the public, and regulate compensation 
practices, they “succeeded only in moving executive pay from one pocket to 
another.”179  The first example of this is the change the SEC made in 1942 that 
required “simple-to-understand” tables disclosing executive compensation.180  
Prior to this, firms would describe compensation in narrative form, so the change 
in SEC rules was indeed an improvement in clarity and better allowed a 
comparison between firms and from year-to-year.181  However, the forms in effect 
limited the types of compensation that had to be reported, and thus invited the 
dramatic increase in use of a wide variety of compensation “hidden payment 
vehicles” that did not need to be reported.182  This persisted up until 1978, when 
the SEC issued new rules requiring the inclusive reporting “of all compensation 
types.”183  This change in 1978 resulted in executive compensation shifting back 
towards salary since there were no gains to be had by using hidden payment 
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vehicles or extravagant perks.184 
B. Limiting the Tax Deductibility of Certain Executive Compensation 
Another example of a federal attempt to regulate compensation practices that 
only succeeded in moving executive pay from one pocket to another, with “the 
cure being worse than the disease,”185 is I.R.C. § 162(m),186 which was signed in 
1993.187  In 1993, President Clinton proposed and Congress adopted I.R.C. § 
162(m), “that disallows deductions for nonperformance related compensation over 
one million dollars for the CEO” as well as the other four highest compensated 
officers of the corporation.188  This provision does not apply to compensation “on a 
commission basis, compensation that is performance-based, and compensation 
under a binding written contract in effect on February 13, 1993.”189 
“Although the objective of Congress in enacting 162(m) was to reduce 
excessive compensation, shareholder activists were mostly concerned with 
enhancing relation between pay and performance.”190  For example, the House 
Ways and Means Committee stated the following intent of the provision: 
Recently, the amount of compensation received by corporate executives has 
been the subject of scrutiny and criticism.  The committee believes that excessive 
compensation will be reduced if the deduction for compensation (other than 
performance-based compensation) paid to the top executives of publicly held 
corporations is limited to $1 million per year.191  
To further support Congress’s intention of 162(m) being a measure to shape 
corporation behavior rather than raise substantial revenue, a “survey reports that 
87% of the firms surveyed intended to implement [the required] changes for 
positive shareholder relations while only 43% [ ] mentioned [ ] [tax] 
considerations . . .192  While the firms were conscious of conforming to 162(m), it 
wasn’t necessarily evidenced by a reduction in a total executive compensation-
bonus and long-term incentive plans and grants of restricted stock “nearly doubled 
from 1992 to 1997” following the implementation of 162(m).193 
This new law called “any [corporate executive] pay above $1 million that 
[was not] tied to performance ‘excessive’” and thus made that portion of executive 
pay above $1 million not deductible from corporate income.194  This had multiple 
perverse effects.  One unintended effect was that it “legitimized” this $1 million 
amount as the baseline for executive pay, and thus over time, this had the net 
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impact of increasing, or ratcheting up, the average CEO pay.195  Additionally, 
because the stated purpose of the law was to tie CEO compensation to corporate 
performance, after 1993 there was a major shift and large increase to the use of 
employee stock option grants, which created an almost reckless obsession with 
short-term earnings and directly lead to the inevitable accompanying accounting 
scandals.196 
C. Other Examples of Using the Tax Code to Limit Executive Compensation 
There are many examples to illustrate that the use of tax code to restrict what 
concerned politicians saw as excessive executive compensation has been 
notoriously ineffective.  Both of the following examples once again illustrate a 
“ratchet effect” on CEO compensation, where the unintended consequence was to 
actually raise average compensation by increasing acceptable minimums for 
certain compensation practices.  For instance, in 1984, IRC § 280G197 “disallowed 
tax deductions for golden parachutes in excess of 2.99 times [an executive’s] 
annual compensation . . . .”198  Naturally, as section 162(m) had standardized a $1 
million CEO salary, section 280G effectively made a golden parachute at 2.99 
times annual compensation the legitimized standard.199  In 1989, IRC § 4999 was 
adopted,200 which required executives to pay a 20% excise tax on golden 
parachutes above the 2.99 times annual compensation limit.201  The reaction of 
compensation committees to this was additional payments to executives to cover 
the new mandatory 20% excise tax, plus cover the extra tax created by this 
additional payment itself.202  Thus section 4999 resulted in not only an additional 
transfer of shareholder value to a departed executive, additional shareholder value 
was also being transferred to the federal government.203  It is a straightforward 
conclusion that these types of efforts to “cap[] on compensation through the tax 
code do not work because they are specific and proscriptive, and therefore easily 
circumvented or abused by compensation committees.”204 
D. Comprehensive Disclosure of Executive Compensation 
Since the Securities Act of 1933,205 the SEC has focused on disclosure rules, 
and in fact, “today the United States has the most comprehensive disclosure rules 
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of any country.”206  The SEC changes to disclosure rules in 1942 and 1978 have 
already been discussed above.207  The basic assumption driving the SEC to ever 
more transparent disclosure of corporate executive compensation policies and 
practices is that it will “shame” boards of directors into doing the right thing for 
their shareholders and employees.208   
The increased public attention on the pay for performance relation resulted in 
regulatory intervention by the SEC in 1993.209  These additional disclosure 
requirements included “enhanced disclosure on executive compensation and the 
enactment of tax legislation limiting the deductibility of nonperformance related 
compensation over one million dollars. . . .”210  The goal of these requirements was 
to make disclosure of executive compensation paid “clearer and more concise” and 
more useful to shareholders.211 
Some of the main features of the new rules were that companies: 1) compare 
financial performance to an industry benchmark with graphs and tables; 2) disclose 
the annual and long-term compensation for the CEO and four most highly paid 
executives; 3) estimate the present value of managerial stock options; and 4) 
provide a report by the compensation committee identifying measures used to 
evaluate executives.212  Interestingly, research has shown that upon examination, 
“managers choose industry- and peer-company stock return benchmarks that are 
downward biased”, which in turn overstate the firm’s performance.213   
In 2006, the SEC created the “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” filing 
which requires companies “to disclose all prior and potential payments [to 
executives], of any form or function[,]” including “perks, severance, and 
retirement packages, as well as payout ranges for incentive plans. . . .”214  All of 
this focus, decade after decade, on increased transparency of executive 
compensation, has been ineffective, as CEO pay has actually increased as 
disclosure requirements increased.215  Even with increasing SEC disclosure 
requirements, compensation committees and compensation experts seek loopholes, 
as well as more “opaque” methods of compensation.216  Plus, disclosure of 
compensation packages can actually lead to the ratchet effect as other executives 
and their supportive compensation committees seek to not fall behind other 
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companies’ practices.217 
VIII. NEW AND PROPOSED EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION SOLUTIONS 
A. Use of Progressive Tax System to Redistribute Income 
Do taxes really redistribute income?  In spite of the progressive structure of 
federal income tax in the United States, the answer to this question, according to 
multiple studies, appears to be “no.”218  While using government sources can 
“show a little bit of progressivity,” the effective tax rates do not really accomplish 
any real redistribution of income as a result of attempts to tax the rich to transfer 
income (and thus redistribute their wealth) to other members of society.219  There 
are multiple reasons for this.  First, the effective tax rate for income earners is 
different from the official tax rates because all types of taxes across all 
governmental levels must be considered, including not just federal income taxes, 
but also state taxes, local taxes, payroll taxes, and sales taxes, among others.220  
Additionally, the wealthy tend to earn much more of their income from sources 
other than wages and salaries, such as investments that are either tax-free or taxed 
at capital gains rates, which also reduce the intended impact of the sharply 
progressive federal tax rates for ordinary income.221  Although the top income 
earners do indeed pay the majority of income taxes, this is likely a result of the 
extreme concentration of income in the top percentile, and has done nothing to 
reverse the increase in income inequality or the concentration of wealth into the 
hands of fewer individuals and families.222  There is no reason to believe the 
American political system will suddenly allow or tolerate the use of the income tax 
system for the effective outright seizure of excessive CEO income.  While it may 
appeal to some to further increase the federal income tax rates on higher income 
earners to extreme levels, historically, increasing the progressivity of the tax 
system to either discourage the increase in CEO wages or encourage after-the-fact 
taxing away of the effective disparity in income, has proven to be a failure.223   
B. Dodd-Frank 
On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) was signed into law.224  While Dodd-Frank as a 
whole “focuses primarily on the financial services industry,” some requirements 
are applicable to executive compensation, including Say on Pay, Shareholder Vote 
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on “Golden Parachutes,” Disclosure of Relationship of Pay to Performance, 
Disclosure of CEO Compensation Pay Ratio, Independence of Compensation 
Committee Members, and Independence of Compensation Committee Advisors.225  
Dodd-Frank also includes rules for financial institutions that “[e]xpand[] regulation 
of compensation arrangements that may encourage inappropriate risk-taking.”226   
Dodd-Frank will not work to stop this because, for the most part, we 
Americans tend not to invest directly in stocks; instead, we outsource this by 
investing in mutual and pension funds.227  These institutions own about two-thirds 
of all stock.228  Thus, when 98.5% of companies that put their executive pay plans 
up for a vote by shareholders, they received a resounding “yes,” the Wall Street 
Journal reports.229 
The 2011 proxy season introduced Say on Pay (SOP), Say on Frequency 
(SOF), and Say on Golden Parachutes (SOGP).230  For the currently available 2011 
data for Say on Pay, Say on Frequency, and Say on Golden Parachutes, companies 
have not had problems obtaining shareholder support.231 
Following the implementation of SOGP, golden parachutes have been met 
with “overwhelming support” from shareholders, with every company that 
reported results as of September 26, 2011, receiving majority support.232  
However, support for the bonuses and compensation packages for executives in the 
related mergers is lower than approval for the overall deals themselves.233  But, 
shareholders are not withholding support for golden parachutes in lieu of any 
claimed exorbitant compensation—they are “likely to support the [golden 
parachutes] when they believe the overall transaction makes sense.”234 
C. Reforms that Seek to Balance Tensions Between a Firm’s Stakeholders 
Matsumura and Shin discuss some of the more widely discussed and 
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proposed principles and reforms for CEO compensation that seek to better balance 
the tensions that exist between each of a firm’s stakeholders.235  For each of five 
different proposals for reform they identify the intended and unintended 
consequences. 
The first reform discussed by Matsumura and Shin is to require greater 
independence of compensation committees.236  The theory is that a truly 
independent compensation committee has the potential to play a significant role in 
limiting excessive CEO compensation practices.237  For instance, the New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) has rules that require firms to have compensation 
committees that are entirely composed of outside independent directors.238  
Furthermore, the NYSE has a rule that the CEO cannot be a member of the 
nominating committee for directors, so that it is more likely that appointed 
directors will be truly independent and not beholden to the CEO.239  All of these 
rules appear theoretically sound when it comes to establishing appropriate CEO 
compensation that is not excessive.  Unfortunately, multiple studies find no 
evidence that having affiliated versus independent directors leads to greater levels 
of CEO compensation.240 
Another principle examined by Matsumura and Shin is to require executives 
to hold significant equity positions in the corporation.241  The theory is to more 
directly align executive’s interest in the firm with shareholders’ interests.242  
However, there is a mounting body of research that challenges this theory.243  One 
problem is that there is a “discrepancy between the economic value of [stock] 
options and the value of [stock] options to executives. . . .”244  Plus, self-serving 
executives can time the release of news and the timing of certain other matters in 
ways that maximize their personal holdings of stock options.245  In fact, there is 
evidence that CEOs with large holdings of stock options will be tempted to use 
artificial means, such as accounting practices, to maximize their wealth.246   
Matsumura and Shin also examined whether enhanced transparency through 
requiring ever greater disclosure of executive compensation will limit excessive 
CEO compensation practices.247  In examining the research available they find it 
difficult to conclude whether firms enjoy any net benefit from increased disclosure 
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requirements.248  In fact, a firm may experience a negative impact through 
increased costs, as public disclosure may ratchet up CEO pay as firms participate 
in a “beauty contest” “as firms seek to ensure that their executives are among the 
higher paid.”249 
Matsumura and Shin examined the impact of increased institutional investor 
involvement in corporate governance, including monitoring CEO pay versus 
performance.250  They note that the literature available provides only mixed 
findings on the role that institutional investor involvement plays in restraining 
CEO compensation.251  Also, it is unclear whether institutional investors such as 
mutual fund advisors have much incentive to monitor and become involved in 
individual firms’ governance, since they can simply err on the side of liquidity if 
trading costs are low enough for firms they believe have bad governance.252 
The last reform that Matsumura and Shin examined is to require firms to 
expense stock options in their income statements.253  Some believe that doing this 
will lead to better compensation practices.254  However, an equal argument can be 
made that adding these expenses to the income statement will simply harm 
employees, since firms will now have a strong economic incentive to stop granting 
stock options to employees.255 
D. Dynamic Compensation Model 
Maybe a fundamental rethink is in order.  For instance, it has been proposed 
to solve the potential problem of CEO excessive and unmerited pay by introducing 
a dynamic compensation model, implemented using a mechanism called a 
“Dynamic Incentive Account.”256  This new model is designed to address problems 
such as short-term orientation, premature payouts, and inappropriate stock 
incentives after stock price declines.257  Many models of CEO compensation 
consider only a single period or single pay out.258  However, it is noted that such a 
static compensation contract may be found ineffective, given what is actually an 
ever changing and dynamic world.259  Incentives may lose their power over time, 
and “if firm value declines, options may fall out of the money and bear little 
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sensitivity to the stock price.”260  Also, single-period contracts can encourage the 
CEO to engage in behavior that benefits him immediately in the current period that 
his compensation is tied to, such as inflating the current stock price and selling off 
without regard for the longevity and health of the organization.261  Conversely, a 
dynamic model in the form proposed, where the CEO’s expected incentive pay is 
placed into a “Dynamic Incentive Account,” provides opportunities for a firm to 
implement metrics that truly tie compensation to stock performance and firm value 
over the long run.262  The account, comprised of both cash and the firm’s equity, 
would serve to escrow a CEO’s expected pay.263  It would also incorporate the 
capability to rebalance the equity proportion to assure appropriate incentive, along 
with “time-dependent vesting” to deter “short-termism”.264  This focus on 
rewarding effort with future rather than current pay can require the CEO to remain 
sensitive to a firm’s future performance, even beyond their own retirement.265 
 
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The increase in the United States of the CEO versus employee pay gap is of 
legitimate concern and has been for some time.  This growing gap is especially 
astonishing when compared to CEO pay levels in other countries.266  While part of 
the disparity between the pay of U.S. and foreign CEOs can be justified by 
differences in social and business environments, including systems that are debt-
based rather than equity-based, the gap is so large by any standard it must be 
considered excessive.  Excessive CEO pay can be, and is, harmful to both business 
and society.267  The potential harm to U.S. businesses includes suboptimal returns 
to stakeholders because of compensation practices that emphasize short-term over 
long-term management decisions and also tend to unnecessarily transfer capital 
and returns away from the company, its employees, and shareholders.268  The 
potential harm to society includes the very real danger that excessive executive pay 
and the bad corporate behavior and the poor results it causes will play a disruptive 
role in the American political and economic system.269  The recent near-collapse of 
the banking and financial systems, and the migration of whole segments of 
American industry overseas are evidence of this. 
Thus, there is a very real need to curb any tendency of excess in CEO 
compensation.  Unfortunately, past U.S. government actions related to excessive 
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CEO compensation practices and reporting can be deemed a failure as they have 
actually had the perverse effect of introducing and amplifying the problem.270  
However, this does not mean nothing can be done about the problem.271  Company 
policies emphasizing and rewarding long-term management decisions would be a 
start.  As discussed in this paper, the deadly combination of an incentive system 
that excessively relies on stock options within a short-term reward structure and an 
imbalance of power between the CEO and the board of directors, both highlight 
much of the root cause of the excessive CEO compensation problem and where to 
look to fix it. 
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